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THE EFFECT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
ON SYSTEMIC TRUST 
CEPS WORKING DOCUMENT NO. 316/JULY 2009 
FELIX ROTH
* 
he collapse of Lehmann Brothers in mid-September 2008 had an enormous impact on the 
financial markets and the global economy by undermining trust – trust in counterparties 
among banks and trust in the overall stability of the financial system, but also citizens’ 
trust in their institutions – systemic trust – and the validity of the underlying principles. It is thus 
not surprising that re-establishing trust in the financial system has become a key task for policy-
makers throughout Europe (and the US). This paper aims to contribute to the ongoing 
discussion of the impact of the financial crisis on trust by presenting recent empirical results 
concerning the reaction to the crisis as reflected in citizens’ diminished levels of systemic trust. 
Within the paradigm of systemic trust, special attention is given to the confidence invested in: i) 
political institutions at European and national level and ii) the free market economy.  
The paper is divided into five sections. Section 1 briefly elaborates on the key role of systemic 
trust and cites some basic figures concerning public demand for more state intervention. Using 
time series data
1 from the public opinion monitoring unit of the European Commission 
(Eurobarometer), section 2 demonstrates the consequences of the financial crisis on public 
opinion vis-à-vis the three major European institutions: the European Central Bank, the 
European Commission and the European Parliament. Section 3 examines the relationship 
between European and national institutions using time trend data on trust towards national 
governments and national parliaments from Eurobarometer and the Edelman Trust Barometer. 
Section 4 shows cross-country results for the five largest European economies and the US and 
time trend data for Germany to demonstrate how the confidence levels in social market 
economies per se have been falling after the financial crisis. Section 5 offers conclusions. 
1.  The key role of sufficient levels of systemic trust 
Social scientists from all fields agree that a sufficient level of trust, especially systemic or 
institutional trust, plays a crucial part in the stability and maintenance of the social, political and 
economic system. When trust breaks down, the social system is threatened with unrest, the 
democratic legitimacy of the political system is endangered and the legitimacy of the market-
based economy is called into question. The latter should be mentioned in particular. Citizens’ 
loss of confidence in a market-based economy is often expressed in one of two ways. They 
pressure the government to either abolish the free-market system altogether or to intervene more 
heavily in the system. The likelihood of the first scenario materialising is rather small, as polls 
                                                      
* Felix Roth is a Research Fellow at CEPS. He wishes to thank the Austrian Ministry of Finance for its 
grant to finance the study “Who can be trusted after this financial crisis?”. This paper has been produced 
as part of the project. He also thanks Edmond Coughlan and Chiara Coldebella for excellent research 
assistance. 
1.Raw data available on CD-ROM from Gesis ZA Data Service for Standard Eurobarometers 51-62 
(Gesis 2005a, 2005b) and received on request from Gesis ZA Data Service for Standard Eurobarometers 
63-69 (http://www.gesis.org/en/services/data/survey-data/eurobarometer-data-service/data-access/). Data 
for the Standard Eurobarometer 70 were taken from Eurobarometer (2008 and 2009b). Aggregated data 
for the EU27 for the Standard Eurobarometer 71 were taken from Eurobarometer (2009a).  
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taken in world’s largest economies indicate that a majority of citizens are still content with a 
market-based economy. In some economies, however, notably Germany, anti-capitalist 
sentiments are growing stronger (FT/Harris Poll, 2008 and Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, 
2008). According to a GlobeScan (2008a) survey conducted in May-August 2007, a significant 
decrease in the confidence in free market economies had started as early as 2002 in Germany, 
the US, the UK and the emerging economies.  
The second scenario in fact is more realistic, as evidenced by increasing calls for stronger state 
intervention. Citizens want more state intervention at the national and regional level and less 
integration of their economies in a more globalised context. Recent polls suggest that 
globalisation is seen as a threat by citizens throughout the world. According to the Edelman 
Trust Barometer (2009) conducted in January 2009, for instance, 65% of the all respondents (a 
figure that rises to 84% in France) agreed that their government should impose stricter 
regulations and greater control over businesses in all industries. According to an FT/Harris poll 
from mid-October 2008, 81% of Italian, 70% of German, 68% of French and 59% of British 
respondents support increased regulation by their governments of businesses activities. Citizens 
had expressed strong fears about globalisation even before the financial crisis. A GlobeScan 
(2008b) survey conducted shortly before the financial crisis erupted indicated that a majority 
(72%) of respondents in 23 countries were in favour of measures to protect jobs and national 
industries, and 63% overall favour restricting foreign ownership of national companies. And 
according to an FT/Harris poll (2009) in March 2009, already more US citizens tend to agree 
(30%) than to disagree (24%) that national protectionism is the correct instrument to end the 
economic recession. 
2.  Has the financial crisis undermined citizens’ levels of confidence? 
Evidence from Eurobarometer 
One of the crucial research questions emerging from the ongoing crisis is how strongly the crisis 
is affecting European citizens’ level of confidence in various institutions. The collapse of the 
financial sector has made European citizens aware of the fact that capitalist systems are more 
fragile than they believed they were. But what is the concrete impact on their trust in European 
and national institutions? Time trend data on confidence levels are still scarce, but one possible 
source are the survey findings released by Eurobarometer (EB) on the European and national 
institutions. Thus, to answer the important question on the evolution of European citizens’ 
confidence levels, time series data from EB have been utilised to show the trend in trust for the 
EU15 and starting in spring 2007, for the EU27 regarding: 
i)  the European Central Bank (ECB), 
ii)  the European Commission (EC) and  
iii) the European Parliament (EP).  
Figure 1 shows the time trend in net levels of trust
2 in the European Central Bank for the 12 
member states of the eurozone.
3 
                                                      
2  In order to control for the significant variations in the “Don’t know” answers, net trust values are given 
in this paper when using EB data. ‘Net trust’ here looks only at those respondents who have an opinion 
and subtracts the percentage of those who say they do not have trust from those who say they have trust in 
the system. Thus a value above zero indicates that overall there are more people who trust than distrust 
and a value below zero indicates that the majority of people distrusts. 
3 The question of confidence in the ECB is really only relevant in the case of those countries that have 
implemented the euro. Therefore, only data from the euro area member states (EA12) have been used. THE EFFECTS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS ON SYSTEMIC TRUST | 3 
 
The two last observations in Figure 1 were gathered after the financial crisis. Interestingly, in 
the autumn 2008 (October-November 2008) poll (Standard EB 70), one month after the 
financial crisis first hit, the erosion of European citizens’ confidence levels in the ECB was still 
rather modest, whereas by January-February 2009 (Standard EB 71), the decline in confidence 
in the ECB reached an historically low level in the EU27.
4 For the first time since the creation 
of the ECB, more European citizens tend to mistrust the ECB than to trust it. One has to 
underline here that the ECB is directly relevant for the citizen’s in the EA12 countries, as their 
national central banks have given up their autonomy to this institution. We now have to wait for 
the results of the Standard EB 72 to know if this trend will continue as sharply as in the interval 
between Standard EB70 (October-November 2008) and Standard EB71 (January-February 
2009) or whether it comes to a halt. One last remark on the interpretation of the data is 
necessary. The actual confidence levels in the ECB with a net value of -1% is still higher than 
the confidence levels in national governments and parliaments with net values ranging from -
27% to -24%. 
Figure 1. Net trust in the ECB in the EA12 (EU27), 1999-2009 
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Data source: Eurobarometer, Standard EB Nos. 51-71 
 
To analyse whether this trend is also applicable to other European institutions, Figure 2 shows 
the trend in net confidence towards the European Commission. Although the decrease in 
confidence towards this institution has not been as significant as that towards the ECB, it clearly 
supports the argument that there is a general decrease of citizens’ confidence towards the 
European institutions since the financial crisis in mid-September 2008. More concretely, the 
decrease in October-November 2008 was followed by a stronger decrease in the confidence 
levels in January-February 2009 for the EU27. In contrast to the results discussed above, the 
levels of confidence in the European Commission are still slightly higher than the ECB. 
However, citizens’ confidence has reached the same low level as it did in spring 1999 a decade 
ago and might reach its lowest confidence level in autumn 2009, once the data from the next 
                                                                                                                                                            
However, the results do not differ significantly when using an EU15 or EU27 country sample. As the time 
trend from 1999-2009 is of primary importance in Figure 1, the four new countries Slovenia, Cyprus, 
Malta and Slovakia that joined the euro area recently have not been included in constructing the average.  
4 Construction of the average for the EA12 countries from the Standard EB 71 (January-February 2009) is 
not yet possible as the data have not yet been officially released. Up to now only the aggregated data for 
the EU27 have been published in the Analytical Summary of the Eurobarometer poll on “European   
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Standard Eurobarometer can be evaluated. Again one should note that these confidence levels 
are still significantly higher than the confidence expressed in the national governments. 
Figure 2. Net trust in the European Commission in the EU15 (EU27), 1999-2009 
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Data source: Eurobarometer, Standard EB Nos. 51-71. 
 
To get the full picture of the trends in confidence levels towards the European institutions, 
Figure 3 shows net confidence levels in the European Parliament for the last decade. In a similar 
pattern to that observed with the ECB, the confidence level in the EP has reached an historical 
low with a net trust value of 8% in January-February 2009 on the part of the EU27.  
Figure 3. Net trust in the European Parliament in the EU15 (EU27), 1999-2009 
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Data source: Eurobarometer, Standard EB Nos. 51-71. THE EFFECTS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS ON SYSTEMIC TRUST | 5 
 
3.  How did the financial crisis affect confidence in the national 
governments? 
The interesting question that now arises is whether this strong decrease in confidence levels in 
European institutions is accompanied by a similar pattern of declining confidence in national 
institutions.  
Two different sources of data are utilised to answer this question. One source is the set of time 
trend data taken from the Edelman Trust Barometers.
5 Respondents were asked how much they 
trusted the government to do what is right. Figure 4 shows the average time trend for the five 
European countries Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom and Spain. According to the 
Edelman Trust Barometers trust in national government actually increased from 2008 – before 
the financial crisis – to November-December 2008 – after the financial crisis. In particular, the 
increases in Germany (from 27% to 35%) and the increases in the United Kingdom (from 34% 
to 41%) in the confidence in the government were rather strong. This phenomenon is not 
precisely new as empirical evidence suggests that trust in the national government appears to 
increase after the occurrence of a national crisis. This could already be observed after the attacks 
on the United States in September 2001 (Chanley, 2002).
6 In times of severe crisis, citizens’ 
confidence towards their national institutions seems to increase. However, one has to remark 
that, in contrast to the experiences of the five big European economies, there were significant 
decreases in levels of public trust, from 39% before to 30% after the crisis, in the United States.  
Figure 4. Trust in the national government on the part of European G5 counties, 2004-2009 
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Data source: Edelman Trust Barometers, 2004-2009. 
Thus, the Edelman data suggest that the trend seems to be diametrically opposed to confidence 
towards the European institutions. But is this trend supported by evidence from Eurobarometer? 
Recent data from Eurobarometer seem to support an inverse relationship between confidence in 
European institutions and national institutions. The best analysis for testing the assumption is to 
compare the same institution, in this case the parliament, on a European and national level. Thus 
                                                      
5 Data from the 2004 to 2009 period are provided by the Edelman Trust Barometer reports which can be 
downloaded at http://www.edelman.co.uk/trustbarometer. Unlike the Eurobarometer surveys, the 
Edelman Trust Barometer surveys are not based on a representative sample of the population but are 
purposely constructed to monitor opinions of  ‘elites’. Therefore, the Edelman Trust Barometer 
population is college-educated and reports a household income in the top quartile of their country.  
6 Although the September 11 attacks were not of an economic character, but rather were general attacks 
on the US, these figures might nevertheless give some indication of the trend in government confidence in 
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Figure 5 shows the time trend data from Eurobarometer from 2001 to 2008
7 for citizens’ net 
confidence in national parliaments. Similarly to the Edelman data, one can observe an increase 
in confidence in the EU27 in the national parliaments after the financial crisis in October-
November 2008.  
Figure 5. Net trust in national parliaments for EU15 (EU27), 2001-08 
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Data source: Eurobarometer, Standard EB Nos. 56-70 
 
Figure 6. Net trust in national governments for EU15 (EU27), 2001-2008 
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Data source: Eurobarometer, Standard EB Nos. 56-70 
But does this relationship also hold for confidence in other national institutions? Also utilising 
Eurobarometer data, Figure 6 plots data showing trends in confidence towards national 
government. In examining the time trend data on confidence in national governments from 
2001-08, shown in Figure 6, one detects a significant increase in the EU27. Thus data from the 
both Eurobarometer surveys as well as the Edelman Trust Barometer support a diametrically 
opposed trend between citizens’ confidence towards European and national institutions after the 
                                                      
7 Data on the confidence towards national institutions from the Standard EB 71 have not even been 
published in the analytical summary on the Eurobarometer European Parliament (Eurobarometer, 2009a). 
The data from autumn 2008 (Standard EB 70) have only been released for the aggregated values for the 
EU27 (Eurobarometer 2009b). Thus one has to wait for the publication of the data from the Standard EB 
71 to evaluate the trend of the net trust levels towards national institutions. THE EFFECTS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS ON SYSTEMIC TRUST | 7 
 
financial crisis. The data sets of the upcoming standard Eurobarometers 71 and 72 have to be 
examined once they are available to shed more light on the confidence trend towards national 
institutions.    
4.  The effect of the financial crisis on citizens’ confidence in the market 
economy 
A certain level of citizens’ confidence in market-based economies is crucial for the maintenance 
of social peace and the stability of the economic system. It guarantees citizens’ support of an 
economic system in which the means of production are privately owned and operated for profit 
through of free market mechanisms. According to the results of an FT-Harris poll, as depicted in 
Figure 7, the level of confidence towards capitalistic free market economies is distributed 
differently throughout the different European countries and the US. When asked in October, 
directly after the beginning of the financial crisis whether the current financial crisis had been 
caused more by “abuses of capitalism” or by the “failure of capitalism itself”, an astonishing 
30% of German respondents selected the latter explanation. This value is four times higher than 
the 7% obtained in the US and nearly twice as high as that obtained in France, at 17%. These 
strong German anti-capitalist sentiments are accompanied by a significant increase in discontent 
expressed by German citizens with the concept of a social market economy. Figure 8 shows the 
German trend data (Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, 2008) towards trust in the social 
market economy. From 2003 until November 2008, there was a significantly steady increase in 
the number of German citizens who thought that the social market economy was unjust, by a 
clear majority of 49% vs. 34% after the financial crisis in November 2008. This increase in 
German citizens’ discontent with the social market economy is also supported by time trend 
data and a poll conducted by the Bertelsmann Stiftung (2008) in May 2008, which found that 
73% of German citizens evaluated the income distribution in Germany as unfair. Similarly, 
according to the WIN Crisis Index (2009) conducted in January 2009, German citizens have one 
of the lowest confidence levels towards banks, stock markets and their government compared to 
other G20 countries. However, these results could merely reflect the fact that the German 
economy has been hit the hardest among the world’s largest economies by the financial crisis 
with an expected decrease of economic growth by a staggering 6%. Thus German citizens might 
have been aware of this fact from the earliest stages of the financial crisis.  
Figure 7. Abuse or failure of capitalism? – Anti-capitalist tendencies among G8 countries 
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Figure 8. German social market economy – Socially just versus unjust 
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Data source: Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach (2008).  
5. Conclusion 
As could be presumed, the financial crisis had a significant impact on the levels of trust that 
citizens place in the system and its institutions. Recent data show a significant fall in the 
confidence of European citizens’ in the EU’s institutions. This sharp decline of confidence can 
be best observed in the case of the European Central Bank. For the first time since its creation, a 
majority of European citizens no longer trusts the ECB.  
However, the significant decrease in European citizen’s confidence towards the two other 
European institutions – the European Commission and the European Parliament – is not 
replicated at the national level. Two independent data sources highlight that confidence levels in 
national governments have actually risen supporting a contrasting trend between the confidence 
in European and national institutions. It remains to be seen whether or not this first indication 
points towards a new trend of re-nationalisation. However, one can clearly observe that the level 
of trust in the European institutions remains much higher than that for national institutions, but 
the advantage enjoyed by ‘Europe’ has been significantly reduced. 
This decrease in confidence towards the ECB is flanked in the case of Germany by strong anti-
capitalist sentiments and a sharp decline in support for the social market economy, with 30% of 
Germans identifying the current financial crisis as a failure of capitalism and around 50% 
characterising the social market economy as unjust, compared to around 35% who still identify 
it as just. 
One now has to wait for the release of the forthcoming data from Standard Eurobarometers 71 
and 72, which will further help to more precisely evaluate the effects of the financial crisis on 
levels of systemic trust towards European and national institutions.  
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